Files
dbbackup/internal/security/paths.go
Renz a0e7fd71de security: Implement HIGH priority security improvements
HIGH Priority Security Features:
- Path sanitization with filepath.Clean() for all user paths
- Path traversal attack prevention in backup/restore operations
- Secure config file permissions (0600 instead of 0644)
- SHA-256 checksum generation for all backup archives
- Checksum verification during restore operations
- Comprehensive audit logging for compliance

New Security Module (internal/security/):
- paths.go: ValidateBackupPath() and ValidateArchivePath()
- checksum.go: ChecksumFile(), VerifyChecksum(), LoadAndVerifyChecksum()
- audit.go: AuditLogger with structured event tracking

Integration Points:
- Backup engine: Path validation, checksum generation
- Restore engine: Path validation, checksum verification
- All backup/restore operations: Audit logging
- Configuration saves: Audit logging

Security Enhancements:
- .dbbackup.conf now created with 0600 permissions (owner-only)
- All archive files get .sha256 checksum files
- Restore warns if checksum verification fails but continues
- Audit events logged for all administrative operations
- User tracking via $USER/$USERNAME environment variables

Compliance Features:
- Audit trail for backups, restores, config changes
- Structured logging with timestamps, users, actions, results
- Event details include paths, sizes, durations, errors

Testing:
- All code compiles successfully
- Cross-platform build verified
- Ready for integration testing
2025-11-25 12:03:21 +00:00

73 lines
1.6 KiB
Go

package security
import (
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
// CleanPath sanitizes a file path to prevent path traversal attacks
func CleanPath(path string) (string, error) {
if path == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("path cannot be empty")
}
// Clean the path (removes .., ., //)
cleaned := filepath.Clean(path)
// Detect path traversal attempts
if strings.Contains(cleaned, "..") {
return "", fmt.Errorf("path traversal detected: %s", path)
}
return cleaned, nil
}
// ValidateBackupPath ensures backup path is safe
func ValidateBackupPath(path string) (string, error) {
cleaned, err := CleanPath(path)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Convert to absolute path
absPath, err := filepath.Abs(cleaned)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get absolute path: %w", err)
}
return absPath, nil
}
// ValidateArchivePath validates an archive file path
func ValidateArchivePath(path string) (string, error) {
cleaned, err := CleanPath(path)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Must have a valid archive extension
ext := strings.ToLower(filepath.Ext(cleaned))
validExtensions := []string{".dump", ".sql", ".gz", ".tar"}
valid := false
for _, validExt := range validExtensions {
if strings.HasSuffix(cleaned, validExt) {
valid = true
break
}
}
if !valid {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid archive extension: %s (must be .dump, .sql, .gz, or .tar)", ext)
}
// Convert to absolute path
absPath, err := filepath.Abs(cleaned)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get absolute path: %w", err)
}
return absPath, nil
}